A few years ago, I kind of stumbled into earning a living by teaching history at a junior college. My lessons tend to have grand, portentous titles like “The History of Western Civilization” or “Twentieth Century World History,” but they’re actually rather silly, cobbled together affairs. What I do is delineate very simplified historical narratives to longsuffering students whose enthusiasm for history, and bookish learning in general, is moderate at best. We get along though, because they’re nice kids mostly, and I’m quite ducky and patient and clever and funny. To their relief, I really don’t expect much of them in terms of academic engagement: I feel no particular drive to preach a kerygma of high-cultural fluency that, in any case, would be perceived by them as merely alien and irrelevant. So instead, like a ham (but a pedagogical one), I strive to be entertaining, and I present Mesopotamia, and the Greeks, and so on, in a kind of spirited didactic tap-dance, with lots illustrative anecdotes and “fun facts” about this Pharaoh or that Empress, like bold tabloid headlines: “Fat Kubilai Khan Went Hunting On Platform Born By Four Elephants!” or “Slutty Theodora From Family Of Circus Performers — Worked As Prostitute Before Reigning Over Byzantine Empire!” I suppose I’m trying to use memorable characters like beacons in the night of my students’ nonchalant ignorance… As a joke, on occasion, I give out little stickers to people who volunteer to answer questions. After a long slog through Mercantilism or the Black Death or whatever, I sometimes break out into song (“Don't be mad once you see that he want it! If you liked it then you should've put a ring on it…”), or perhaps recite some William Blake, or decree “mental breaks” to talk about amusing animals like tarsiers, or giraffes, or boogie-woogie birds of paradise. I show pictures and offer intriguing factoids: “Do you know how a giraffe holds its head up all day without getting tired?” Or I mime what a pug’s reverse sneeze might look like. And then, abruptly, I go right back to the treaty of Versailles. It’s a rather good show, as far as it goes. Part stand-up comedy, part “happening,” and part well-meaning instructional pap.
Almost none of
my students read books at all, and they have only the vaguest, most perfunctory
notions about the past: Hitler was very bad… There were mummies in Egypt… One
girl once earnestly asked me at the end of a profitable semester: So who came
first Julius Caesar or Napoleon? Because for her, as for most of my students, neither
are persons residing in a structured, coherent human reality that she can recognize
as in any way congruent to her own; their names don’t even have the abstract
value of signs associated with a an acknowledged “high culture” in relation to
which she might position herself; instead, they are merely foreign, extraneous flotsam
that she can negligently stuff, higgledy-piggledy, along with whatever other educational
debris she happens to stagger across, in a largish metaphorical box marked “school
shit.” More recently, it transpired that a bewildered boy could not complete an
assignment because he just didn’t know that, conveniently, you could locate
books by their call numbers in the library. Now, these are young people in
their late teens and early twenties, sometimes quite intelligent, mostly from
middle-class backgrounds, and heading for university — not nitwits, or the helpless
products of blighted ghettos. They are not technically illiterate, of course:
they can read and write — if, for the most part, with a rather limited
proficiency. Their literacy is shaky simply because the culture they’ve acquired
consists almost entirely of a haphazard mishmash of television, trashy pop
music, advertizing, “social media,” and, as an anthropological twist pertinent
to my own school in particular: whatever usually rather macho and conservative
values they have imbibed from their family’s exotic native folkways. Indeed,
most of my students are first or second generation immigrants to Canada — many
from strongly patriarchal societies. This, as well as the fact that English is
sometimes their second or third language, no doubt adds to the disconnection
they must feel to whatever I’m babbling about — but, in truth, the native
English-speaking students are no more engaged. I find that most of my pupils
are quite shiftless intellectually, and that they all share a fidgety propensity
to cultivate perpetual distraction.
Of course, much
of this is the result of the ubiquitous contemporary technological pollution of
everyday life: the myriad hypnotic screens soliciting your attention; the thin,
exciting music blaring in your ears while you unmindfully hurry up to get to
where you’re going (or perhaps clamoring from an obnoxious dolt’s mobile phone
speaker, on the bus); plethoric incoming text-messages that demand to be
checked willy-nilly mid-conversation, and, like an itch, call for an immediate
response; callow video game fantasies of mayhem; solipsistic pornographic dreams;
hysterical public shaming perpetrated at a distance and anonymously; status
updates and tweets and Instagram pictures of your lunch; Tinder (or Grinder) pictures
of your cock. And, in the midst of all that noise, there’s also the whole
involved business of fitting in, and of friends, and romantic relationships, and
cigarettes, and having all the right symbols of status and generational communion.
But I don’t think the problem is just teenage agitation in the context of a crass
technologically induced philistinism. In the introduction to The Age of Extremes, Eric Hobsbawm’s marvelously
lucid history of the “short twentieth century,” he wrote that:
At the end of
this century it has for the first time become possible to see what a world may
be like in which the past, including the past in the present, has lost its
role, in which the old maps and charts which guided human beings, singly and
collectively, through life no longer represent the landscape through which we
move, the sea on which we sail. In which we do not know where our journey is
taking us, or even ought to take us.
I feel that
my millennial students’ broadly shared aimlessness and inarticulate ineptitude betray that much deeper perplexity which Hobsbawm is
referring to, and which seems to have afflicted all “advanced” societies for
the past several decades. Like the kids in my classes, we all feel ourselves mired,
as if in suspension, in a kind of bewildering, fragmented, amorphous,
a-historical present. Hobsbawm again:
[…] in some ways
the most disturbing, is the disintegration of the old patterns of human social
relationships, and with it, incidentally, the snapping of the links between
generations, that is to say, between past and present. This has been
particularly in the most developed countries of the western version of
capitalism, in which the values of an absolute a-social individualism have been
dominant, both in official and unofficial ideologies, though those who hold
them often deplore their social consequences. Nevertheless, the tendencies were
to be found elsewhere, reinforced by the erosion of traditional societies and
religions, as well as by the destruction, or autodestruction, of the societies
of ‘real socialism.’
So the world has become, in many ways,
quite “illegible” to most people. The traditional framing narratives offered by
religion have long been abandoned or devitalized — or they’ve been distorted
and monstrously transformed by shotgun weddings to foreign and much more recent
revolutionary ideologies (as in the case of militant Islamism). In a real
sense, we seem to have lost our way. The sheer confounding pace and radical scope
of historical change since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution — a
steady acceleration punctuated with dramatic, violent lurches of increasingly
global consequence — seem to have broken our compass. Most recently, we
witnessed the communist block crumble under its own weight in the late eighties
and early nineties, opening the path for the quite obscene and hubristic ecumenical
triumph of neo-liberal market fundamentalism, but this too is now shaken by the
ongoing financial crisis, and the calamitous handling of it by governments and
the grimly obstinate international organs of plutocratic and anti-democratic reaction
(IMF, World Bank, European Commission…). In his own age of confounding upheavals,
Nietzsche had already identified the alarming trend:
For a long time
now our whole civilization has been driving, with a tortured intensity growing
from decade to decade, as if towards a catastrophe: restlessly, violently,
tempestuously, like a mighty river desiring the end of its journey, without
pausing to reflect, indeed fearful of reflection.
Most of us seem to be at least diffusely aware of such a sinister evolution: that
we’re being played for fools and victimized; that the system is perverse and broken;
that the gross inequalities swelling once again between rich and poor are scandalous,
noisome, and unendurable. We’re in fact persuaded that these
injustices should somehow be remedied: "Somebody better do something!" But more, we’re freaked out about global
warming and dead pandas and the irreparable degradation we’re causing to the
environment; we’re convinced that the politicians who so casually pretend to
represent us, far from contributing solutions, are, for the most part, merely craven
blackguards, unimaginative fools, crooks, scoundrels — the minnows and puppets
of the extravagantly wealthy. We perceive that a corrupt, ubiquitous media, largely instrumentalized by these same vested interests, lies to us,
or at least tends to distort and obfuscate factual reality as a matter of
course to manipulate us and exploit our sluggish credulity. But alarmed, angry, and disgusted as we might feel, overall we find ourselves quite powerless to mobilize our defiance in a way that’s more than merely
reactive and rambling. We are lost, and bereft even of the flimsy security blanket
of prayer when we behold a pale horse and its dread rider. Notwithstanding the
valiant and meritorious activism of some, we struggle to form enduring organized
mass movements, which might articulate programs aiming to resist, to overcome, to tear asunder, to
replace the system’s present deleterious configuration.
I feel that out
difficulty isn’t solely organizational or conjunctural, but that it stems from the forlorn intimation that, unlike our optimistic forebears of the Enlightenment, who so earnestly believed in progress and the perfectibility of humankind, we are condemned to fumble through an anomic fog. We are stymied by the anxious, paralyzing conviction, which so many of us seem to share, that everything we can say about
the social world is always to some degree divorced from authentic veracity; that it is equivalent to any other such statement anybody else might make; that, as a rule, our relationship to this elusive social world might itself be incoherent; that values are slippery and impermanent; that words are empty shells, clumsily chanelling bursts of affect rather than transpicuous meaning; that abiding by the prescription of the young Wittgenstein, to pass over in silence what we cannot speak about, is intollerably frightening and that we must instead at all cost attempt to drown it in discursive noise; that, in our unsteady so-called “post-modern” era, as
in the mind-bending physics of relativity, there can exist no absolute frame of reference for our disquiet hearts to find certainty and solace. The
idea that no ideology or single set of values may usefully or perhaps legitimately
be endorsed to represent and structure society appears to have debilitated our collective
capacity to imagine a positive future to aspire to. The neo-liberal right itself
still clings to the hope that it can definitively naturalize its own peculiar fetishism
of free markets in the collective imagination, but in the face of our corrosive
epistemological moment, as well as overwhelming historical confutation, even it
has failed — although, since the representatives of this cult still hold most
of the institutional levers of power, they can probably continue to pretend they
have succeeded for quite a while still. It seems that the “truth,” at least in
terms of some sort of broad social consensus reality, has become deeply problematic,
making it all the more arduous to get our bearings. Undoubtedly, elites have
long relied on the “noble lie” of Plato to keep the hoi polloi in check, but now the anomie is such that even the keepers
and promoters of such lies can’t seem to help falling under their own mendacious
spell — leading to the particularly toxic brew of confusion, denial, bad faith,
manipulation, incoherence, terminal mediocrity, and desperate, impermeable fanaticism that
so characterizes contemporary politics and the attitude of the global elites. As
a byproduct, I suspect it also significantly contributes to the kind of
listless disengagement and nurtured ignorance that I’m confronted with every day
at school, but which my students share with broad sections of the public in
countries like Canada.
In
a memorable short film, Adam Curtis — that inspired virtuoso of the ironic
audiovisual collage as a device to highlight penetrating analysis — points out a
fascinating illustration of how this post-modern mental bric-a-brac of
reticence and befuddlement can actually be actively exploited by sufficiently
shrewd and cynical political actors to wield power. In the film, he presents Vladislav
Surkov, who was one of Vladimir Putin’s closest acolytes in Russia, and one of
the main architects of the so-called "managed democracy" that has
characterized Putin's regime. Surkov's contribution was to propose the generation
of a stupefying, elusive, kaleidoscopic political “reality” for the Russian
people thanks to an elaborate operation of political theatre. It consisted in
conjuring up artificial "grassroots" pro-Putin nationalist movements
like Nashi on the one hand, while on
the other, also funding all sorts of opposition groups — a constantly evolving
mix, which included neo-Nazis as well as progressives. The point of this rather
surprising (limited) support for opposition groups by an authoritarian regime
wasn't, of course, to foster pluralism and political choice, but rather to
muddy the waters, as it were, and to make it very difficult for the public to discern
what was actually going on. But the weird and brilliant final twist was that none
of this was done in secret, quite on the contrary: Surkov publicly flouted and
acknowledged his manipulations. According to Curtis, this strategy is really
the application of practices inspired from contemporary conceptual art to
politics: since no single discourse plausibly describes the world in its
entirety anymore, such descriptions must be multiplied and left to coexist, no
matter how contradictory, or even internally incoherent they might seem. Unlike
in the age of innocence that preceded our muddled, anxious times, it seems that
meaningfully singling out one narrative as "the truth" to the
exclusion of all the others is impossible. Things are happening — bad things
surely, a crisis... But we all remain hypnotized, wrong-footed, mired in the
fractured mindset the authorities assiduously strive to cultivate in us with
their bewildering stories, which are neither clearly truthful nor indubitably mendacious.
And so we remain consternated and befuddled, but, most importantly, impotent witnesses, who can only say
"Oh dear!" while the people pulling the strings are able to have
their way, unseen, untouched, unrecognized. In a way, this reminds me of the
strategy that the famous Palo Alto polymath Gregory Bateson proposed to the US
army during the Second World War to secure its signals communications. Coding
messages was useful obviously, but codes could be broken, and there were only
so many Navajo “code talkers” to go around, so Bateson remarked that a good
approach might be to drown the signal in an ocean of noise — in other words, to
send not one message, but a profusion of them, all at once, with only the
recipient able to distinguish the valid one. So the message, like Edgar Allan
Poe’s purloined letter, would simply be hiding in plain sight.
In any event, what Curtis then argues is that such manipulations are in fact also at work in advanced liberal democracies, like the UK. People in authority assure the public that the economy is picking up — but actually wages are down and unemployment is up. They explain that austerity budgets are a necessity to cut the deficit — but the deficit keeps growing, and in fact, through "quantitative easing," huge amounts of public funds are being transferred into the pockets of the very richest individuals. British soldiers are back from the Afghan war — but it’s quite unclear what the results of this conflict were, and what it was all for. The public is offered no linear explanations, only a profusion of sound bites — and things just don't seem to add up. Governments are doubling down on absurd and unpopular neo-liberal economic policies, which ought to have been utterly discredited by the present ongoing crisis — but, on the contrary, we are told in patronizing tones by the self-appointed grown-ups, the right honorable people in charge, that there is no other choice. Even the most dim-witted of citizens can't help but suspect that they are being steered into the rocks, and yet there are no stirrings of revolution, only quiet desperation, or alternatively, a frantic search for the vulnerable scapegoats provided by racism and xenophobia. Of course, here or in the UK, there probably doesn’t actually exist a self-conscious conspiracy of sinister men called Dr. Evil perhaps or Cobra Commander, or even Vladislav Surkov, meeting in darkened rooms to weave their webs of deceit. There are no Illuminati. But there are corrupted governments and ruling classes completely divorced from the people they are meant to represent. There is a capture and subversion of democratic systems by shockingly avid, ruthless oligarchies, with the complicity of their henchmen in the media and the professional classes. But although the public might have intimations of this, might in fact be confusedly outraged, or furious, or exasperated, nevertheless, no discourse coherently articulating the road to an alternative reality has yet captured the mainstream; no groove yet channels the collective discontent. For now, it is still unclear what to do and where to go.
In any event, what Curtis then argues is that such manipulations are in fact also at work in advanced liberal democracies, like the UK. People in authority assure the public that the economy is picking up — but actually wages are down and unemployment is up. They explain that austerity budgets are a necessity to cut the deficit — but the deficit keeps growing, and in fact, through "quantitative easing," huge amounts of public funds are being transferred into the pockets of the very richest individuals. British soldiers are back from the Afghan war — but it’s quite unclear what the results of this conflict were, and what it was all for. The public is offered no linear explanations, only a profusion of sound bites — and things just don't seem to add up. Governments are doubling down on absurd and unpopular neo-liberal economic policies, which ought to have been utterly discredited by the present ongoing crisis — but, on the contrary, we are told in patronizing tones by the self-appointed grown-ups, the right honorable people in charge, that there is no other choice. Even the most dim-witted of citizens can't help but suspect that they are being steered into the rocks, and yet there are no stirrings of revolution, only quiet desperation, or alternatively, a frantic search for the vulnerable scapegoats provided by racism and xenophobia. Of course, here or in the UK, there probably doesn’t actually exist a self-conscious conspiracy of sinister men called Dr. Evil perhaps or Cobra Commander, or even Vladislav Surkov, meeting in darkened rooms to weave their webs of deceit. There are no Illuminati. But there are corrupted governments and ruling classes completely divorced from the people they are meant to represent. There is a capture and subversion of democratic systems by shockingly avid, ruthless oligarchies, with the complicity of their henchmen in the media and the professional classes. But although the public might have intimations of this, might in fact be confusedly outraged, or furious, or exasperated, nevertheless, no discourse coherently articulating the road to an alternative reality has yet captured the mainstream; no groove yet channels the collective discontent. For now, it is still unclear what to do and where to go.
I
certainly don’t have any straightforward, unequivocal answers. I'm not active politically, and for now at least, what I feel I'm able to contribute is merely to strive to reestablish, in myself and (to some very limited extent) in my pupils, some sort of articulate coherence in our apprehension of the world — a vital sense of continuity between the present and the pregnant sediment of our shared experience. At the beginning of my little history classes, I usually try to
connect the history of civilization with the much longer span of natural
history, to give my students a sense of the relative scale of things, and the
idea that we can adopt a perspective outside the scope of our familiar everyday
understanding. I start by asking them what the age of the universe is, and
sometimes I get the right answer (or anyways, within an order of magnitude…); then
I ask them how old the earth is, and then how long it has supported life (congratulations
are in order for all the correct answers naturally, but also for valiant
guesses). I then ask how long humans just like us have been around. Once this
has been established, conjuring the spirit of a young Nijinski, I stretch out
my arm with dramatic flair and announce that it represents “the staggering and
in fact scarcely fathomable interval of three and a half billion years of life
on earth” — and then, with my free hand, after a solemn pause, I mime filing
away the tip of my outstretched fingernail. On the spot, I bombastically exclaim
that I have just wiped out the whole of human history! This always elicits a
very gratifying reaction. After these theatrics, I usually transition more
soberly to discussing what “civilization” might mean for a while, and then ask whether
anyone knows why living next to horses is preferable to living next to zebras… And I go on to tell them about Jared
Diamond’s theory of geographical determinism: that the reason why certain
people ended up establishing complex settled societies, mastering advanced
technologies, and generally having lots of stuff, while others did not, had
nothing much to do with any innate superiority of certain groups over others but
everything to do with the physical environments they evolved in — the
availability of domesticable plants and animals, and a group’s cultural and
epidemiological connection to or isolation from other human groups. (Though at
this point, I’m momentarily possessed by the infuriated ghost of some
Kipling-loving Victorian colonial officer, who heatedly corrects me in the
snottiest of Eton drawls, by reminding me of “the white man’s burden,” before I
can curtly dismiss this retrogressive apparition and recover my composure…) It’s
quite fun to go through this routine, and the students love it, mostly, or
anyways those who are not too hopelessly obtuse and sullen — but I’m not sure
they actually end up getting anything out of it except a passing diversion. I
suppose what trying to do, in my own small way, is to combat not only their
basic ignorance, but also to help them shake off the broader socially
conditioned discombobulation they are laboring under by presenting the broadest
historical context with which to frame their lives, and hopefully sparking some
sort of insight. But it often feels like I’m writing with water, if
indeed with a bold flourish.
To
be honest, I’m actually not that bothered by what my students get or don’t get out
of my lectures. I suppose it’s up to them, really. In terms of this whole
teaching thing, I feel more like a stranded tourist making the best of it than like
an earnestly conscientious professional. I do try to be quite engaging and to
make “the material” interesting, but for me, as long as I get on reasonably
well with the kids (I do), and I can give my lessons freely, with little effort
and even less supervision (I can); as long as I collect a decent wage (bah!), and
have enough leisure and energy left over for art and writing and friends and clumsily
chasing women and yoga and dining in cheap restaurants (blessed are those who
hunger for chicken koobideh…), I have
learned in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content. But more positively,
giving these classes has been a wonderful incitement for me to read a lot of
history and anthropology and economics, and to think about these things in an
active, engaged manner — to hoist myself out of the murky vagueness of a
“dogmatic slumber” I had let myself wallow in. Since adolescence, I had nurtured
quite a broad and deep artistic and literary culture, and I had also acquired some
grounding in psychology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. But in many ways
I remained quite a naïve person, and to this day, my experience of life has
been rather confined. I grew up very sheltered, but also curious, open-minded
and bookish; I’ve always been interested in people, and strongly, if diffidently
drawn to them — despite a terribly inhibiting timidity, as well as a certain
natural pessimism about my fellow man. As a dashing clever brittle young man, I
had a strong tendency to assume the existence of psychological explanations for
everything, because I was good at reading people and imagining what they might be
thinking; this led me to grossly overestimate the contribution and influence of
individuals in society, and systematically to underestimate the extent to which
broader social and material structures determined their lives and actions — simply
because I either wasn’t aware of the existence of these structures, or if I
was, because I didn’t understand them. But like a lot of people, the ongoing
economic slump and the pernicious policies systematically attacking the weal
and welfare of people like me, which it brought out into the open, served to
sharpen my focus — to pose social life and the way ideas spread and power
operates as the central issues one needs to elucidate. So now, following my own
readings, I lard the official curriculum not only with my needy buffoonery, but
also with bits and pieces of the progressive social consciousness I’ve myself so
belatedly acquired. Just Marxist rudiments really, with a dash of David Graeber
and a smidge of Emmanuel Todd and perhaps a pinch of Freud and Michel Foucault and
(why not?) Spinoza or Kurt Gödel on fancy occasions: but mostly class struggle,
and the brutal, pitiless clash within settled civilization of the happy few who
inherit the earth and the shabby many who seem fated for a quite while still to
pine in vain for the great VIP room in the sky, where the last shall be first,
and the organizers do serve fantastic canapés. I notice now that a good deal of
my intellectual effort of the past few years, such as it is, has been to arm myself in some way
against the ambient confusion and deliberate misinformation that makes it so
difficult to grasp what’s going on — and perhaps more importantly, to figure
out what to do about it. A lot of the time, I suppose I’m addressing myself
when I teach my students. Or rather, I seem to be using this captive audience as
a contrivance to clarify my own understanding. No doubt fatuously, I like to
think of whatever enlightenment they happen to pick up in the process as merely
a happy maieutic side effect, but one that nonetheless richly justifies my
emoluments.
Boiled
down, for those of you unhappily deprived of my tuition, my pitch goes something
like this: people are complex and contradictory, and whoever tries to feed you simplistic,
reductive explanations for intricate realities is probably either a fool or a
villain — or perhaps both. Ideas, like waves in the ocean, take on a life of
their own, and societies are traversed by them. Our rationality is bounded, our
lucidity imperfect. Misunderstanding and noise are fundamental features of
communication. These things must be accounted for. Individual men and women can
be fascinating, so they should be examined with interest, critical discernment,
and compassion, but all the while keeping in mind that what determines the
outcomes of historical processes are broader, more diffuse collective
movements: the flood of conjunctural interactions, of internal and external contending
forces and factors, straining, twining, surging, merging to compose the open, complex,
nonlinear system we call society, whose emergent nature is certainly more than
the mere sum of its parts. Geography is perhaps the most crucial of these factors,
because it determines both our natural evolution as a species and the reach of our
material culture. People in the past understood and related to the world in a
very different way to how we do now, and to understand them, as well as our
relationship to them, a tremendous effort of research, erudition, and of the imagination
is required. But this effort is worth making because contemporary values, ideas,
attitudes, ideological preferences all largely stem from the more or less distant past — and, more profoundly, from a kind of slow-unfolding
anthropological substrate of collective experience, such as the often long
bygone or “fossilized” but nevertheless still vitally influential multifarious traditional
configurations of the family. In countless ways, we are still bound and
determined by the past. Such was the vision, the knowledge, the wisdom, the
science, the light that arose in me concerning things not heard before. Life is
beautiful and transient. The mighty Kubilai Khan himself, ruler of all under heaven, who rode four elephants into battle, could not hold on to it forever. So try not to worry too much. And don’t wrestle with bears. Be kind to one another. Resist taking yourself too seriously. Maybe read a book once in a while… A big
one.